What you see is what you do:Imagery and the moral judgements of individuals with OCD by Trafford, Alexia et al.
 1 
Abstract 
Background: It has been suggested that differences in moral judgements play a role 
in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Specifically, it has been proposed that 
individuals with OCD make moral judgements using more deontological rather than 
utilitarian principles. Visualising an image has also been linked to making 
deontological judgements in non-clinical populations; however, this has not yet been 
tested in individuals with OCD, who often experience intrusive imagery. Method: 
One hundred and forty-five participants (including 30 with OCD and 27 in a 
comparison group) answered questions on moral dilemmas that required them to 
choose between deontological and utilitarian options. The mediational role of imagery 
in the relationship between OCD and deontological moral judgements was tested. 
Results: A greater presence of OCD symptomatology was associated with making 
more deontological judgements. However, when compared by group, individuals with 
OCD did not make significantly more deontological judgements. Whilst imagery was 
found to have a relationship with moral judgements, this did not mediate the 
relationship between OCD and moral judgements. Conclusions: The results suggest 
an association between moral judgements and OCD, not mediated by imagery.  
Keywords: OCD, moral judgements, deontology, utilitarianism, imagery. 
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1. Introduction 
Individuals with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) experience repeated 
intrusive thoughts around potential harm to themselves or others and feel compelled 
to act to prevent that harm, which is objectively unlikely to occur (ICD-10, F42). 
Based on research demonstrating that the occurrence of an intrusion is a normal 
phenomenon (Purdon & Clark, 1993; Rachman & de Silva, 1978), the Cognitive 
Behavioural Model of OCD states that a key factor in development and maintenance 
of OCD is the interpretation of the intrusion and, in particular, an interpretation 
around a heightened sense of responsibility of potential harm (Salkovsksis 1985; 
1989, Steketee, Frost & Cohen, 1998). It has been proposed that the occurrence of the 
intrusion raises that individual’s awareness of potential harm and, as such, the 
individual must make a decision as to whether to act to prevent it (Wroe & 
Salkovskis, 2000). The model suggests that individuals with OCD interpret the 
occurrence of the intrusions as meaning a heightened sense of responsibility for 
potential harm and that they have the power to prevent it, resulting in that person 
feeling compelled to act to prevent harm. In contrast, an individual without OCD may 
also experience the intrusion, thus raising their awareness to potential harm, but make 
a decision not to act to prevent that harm (Wroe and Salkovskis, 2000).  
A judgement of responsibility for potential harm is considered a moral 
judgment (Shaver, 1985 as cited in Pizarro, Ulmann & Bloom, 2003). This leads 
moral judgements to contribute towards decision making about action and, ultimately, 
the initiation of action (Bandura, 1991). As individuals with OCD interpret intrusions 
whilst having a heightened sense of responsibility, this may affect their interpretation 
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of moral dilemmas and raises the possibility that they make different judgements to 
individuals without the disorder.  
 There is a growing body of research investigating the potential role of moral 
judgements in people with OCD (Franklin et al. 2009; Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000; 
Mancini & Gangemi, 2015). Some researchers have looked at the role of 
responsibility in moral judgements; for example, Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) who 
hypothesised that a heightened sense of responsibility moderated the relationship 
between intrusive thoughts and moral judgements. Others have focused research on 
other aspects of moral judgements such as whether individuals with OCD make 
decisions based on the morality of the actions involved or based on the overall 
outcome (e.g. Franklin et al., 2009; Mancini & Gangemi, 2015), namely deontological 
or utilitarian judgements.   
One moral dilemma, often referred to in the literature, depicts a fast moving 
trolley that is due to hit and kill five people. The people can be saved if another 
individual is pushed from a footbridge onto the trolley. This would stop the trolley 
from killing five people, but would kill the person pushed. When asked whether this 
action is morally acceptable or not, there seem to be differences in people’s answers 
(Thomson, 1985). The dilemma people often face is in being asked to make a decision 
using deontological principles, favouring the rights of the individual (i.e., the 
individual being pushed) or utilitarian principles, favouring the ‘greater good’ (i.e., 
the five people).  
A deontological judgement is a decision based on the morality of the action 
(whether or not to push the individual), where this is more important than the overall 
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consequences. People who make deontological decisions (i.e. not pushing the 
individual) judge that moral values should not be broken (Kant, 1785 as cited in 
Szekely & Miu, 2015), and that individual rights should be key in making decisions 
(Kant, 1785). In contrast, a utilitarian decision is one that benefits the greater good 
(Mill, 1998). Here, morality is decided by the good in an action’s outcome; thus 
killing a person is acceptable, if multiple others are saved (Mill, 1998).  
It has been proposed that individuals with OCD may have a bias towards using 
a particular type of reasoning process to make moral judgements. For example, 
Franklin, McNally and Riemann (2009) studied whether individuals with OCD tended 
to reason more by using deontological or utilitarian principles, when presented with 
moral dilemmas similar to the example above. Although not statistically significant, 
they found increased OCD symptomatology to be associated with deontological moral 
judgements. Furthermore, an increased sense of responsibility was found to be 
associated with deontological judgements, suggesting a potential role of responsibility 
in moral judgements.  
Mancini (2001) (cited in Mancini & Gangemi, 2004) further suggested that 
compulsive behaviours are triggered by a fear of not acting in a way that is deemed to 
be morally correct. Mancini and Gangemi (2015) studied the moral judgements of 60 
individuals (20 OCD; 20 anxious controls and 20 non-clinical), again in relation to 
moral dilemmas that required participants to choose from deontological or utilitarian 
outcomes.  They found individuals with OCD to be less likely to choose to act to 
prevent harm to an individual, driven by deontological guilt. Thus, they do nothing 
because it is ‘wrong to kill someone’. This suggests that OCD may be associated with 
deontological moral judgements; however, the mechanism by which this takes place 
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remains unclear.  
Intrusive mental imagery is a significant factor in the presentation of OCD. In 
nonclinical populations, having an image in mind when making a moral judgement 
has been linked to people making deontological moral judgements (Amit & Greene, 
2012). Thus, when considering acting to end an individual’s life for the purpose of 
saving a group, having an image of the individual has been found to support the 
judgement that saving the group does not justify ending the life of the individual. 
Given that individuals with OCD often experience distressing images (De Silva, 
1986), and at a greater frequency than in other anxiety disorders (Lipton, Brewin, 
Linke & Halperin, 2010) it is possible that the effect found by Amit and Greene 
(2012) is amplified in these populations. As Amit and Greene (2012) found 
individuals to imagine the potential harm caused by an action more when making 
deontological judgements, it is possible that imagery mediates the relationship 
between OCD and deontological judgements, adding an alternative pathway to that of 
responsibility in the triggering of compulsive behaviours and maintenance of OCD.  
This study aimed to investigate the association between symptoms of OCD 
and deontological moral judgements and explore whether individuals with OCD make 
more deontological judgements than individuals without the disorder. It also aimed to 
explore the potential mediational role of imagery in this relationship. 
1.1 Hypotheses 
OCD symptomatology will be associated with deontological judgements.  
People with OCD will make more deontological than utilitarian judgements, in 
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comparison to those without OCD.  
Imagery will mediate the relationship between OCD and moral judgements. 
2.  Method 
2.1. Participants 
Following approval from the local ethics committee, participants were recruited 
online via Facebook and Twitter, an undergraduate research participation scheme and 
OCD charities. One hundred and forty-five participants (120 females, 23 males, two 
chose not to disclose this information) completed the study. Participants represented 
53.90% of the original sample, following sample attrition and exclusion of one 
participant due to having a diagnosis of psychosis. The participants’ mean age was 
27.86 years (SD=12.13; range=17-70).  
 2.1.1. OCD group. Research has demonstrated that a score of 21 or higher on 
the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R) and 16 or higher on the Yale-
Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale-Self-Report (Y-BOCS-SR) is an indicator of the 
presence of OCD (Foa et al., 2002). A total of thirty participants (25 female, 4 males, 
one stated ‘other’) with these scores met criteria for the OCD group. Their mean age 
was 27.93 (S.D=11.19). Their mean OCI-R score was 38.70 (S.D=11.95) and mean 
Y-BOCS-SR score was 25.70 (S.D=6.91). 83.33% of participants in this group 
reported having a diagnosis of OCD, 70% reported having had treatment for this. All 
met the inclusion criteria above for the OCD group.  
 2.1.2. Comparison group. Previous studies have set arbitrary cut-offs to 
identify a group of individuals for non-OCD comparison groups (e.g., Jones & 
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Bhattacharya, 2014). In order to obtain a comparison group of a similar size to the 
OCD group a sample was selected based on the lowest 18% of scores on the OCI-R 
and Y-BOCS-SR. Inclusion for this group comprised of scoring lower than 13 on the 
OCI-R and lower than 7 on the Y-BOCS-SR. Twenty-seven participants met these 
criteria (21 females, 6 males). Their mean age was 30.93 (S.D=12.17). Their mean 
OCI-R score was 5.78 (S.D=3.24) and mean Y-BOCS-SR score was 1.37 (S.D=1.74) 
No demographic differences were found between these groups. That is in gender, 
ethnicity, marital status, employment status, highest level of education and religion.  
2.2. Materials and Measures 
2.2.1. Socio-demographic information. Information was collected on gender, 
ethnicity, marital status, employment status, highest level of education and religion. 
Participants were also asked about any diagnoses of OCD and associated treatment.  
2.2.2. Verbaliser-Visualiser Questionnaire – Revised (VVQ-R). The VVQ-R 
(Kirby, Moore & Schofield, 1988) is a 20-item self-report measure of verbal/visual 
cognitive style in everyday scenarios. It includes ten statements that relate to a verbal 
cognitive style and ten that relate to a visual cognitive style. Participants were asked 
to mark the statements as ‘true’ or ‘false’. Responses were summed within each 
dimension.  
The VVQ-R has been shown to have good construct validity and adequate 
reliability (α=.70 and .59 respectively; Kirby et al., 1988). Kirby et al., (1988) showed 
that scores in the visual and verbal dimensions of the VVQ-R correlate with objective 
measures of visual and verbal abilities and Kraemer, Rosenberg and Thompson-Schill 
 8 
(2009) found cognitive style, as defined by scores on the VVQ-R, to correlate with 
activity in visual and verbal brain regions.   
2.2.3. Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS).  The SUIS (Reisberg, 
Pearson & Kosslyn, 2003) is a 12-item self-report measure of an individual’s 
spontaneous use of visual, non-emotional, imagery in everyday life. Participants were 
given descriptions of situations in which images are involved and are asked to 
indicate how much each was appropriate for them.  
The author suggested the SUIS to have high internal consistency (at least .98) 
(Reisberg et al., 2003) and this was confirmed by McCarthy-Jones, Knowles and 
Rowse (2012) who reported an internal consistency of α = .83. A Dutch translation of 
the measure has been shown to have acceptable reliability (Chronbach’s alpha of .72) 
and convergent validity (Nelis et al., 2014).  
 2.2.4. OCI-R. The OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002) is an 18 item self-report 
questionnaire that assesses for symptoms of OCD. Participants were asked to rate how 
much particular experiences have distressed them during the past month. Total scores 
were calculated by adding the item scores. The OCI-R has been found to be a good 
measure to discriminate OCD from other anxiety disorders (Abramowitz & Deacon, 
2006) and has been recommended for making diagnostic decisions (Grabill et al., 
2008). 
 Foa et al. (2002) reported the scale to have good internal consistency. It has 
good construct validity (Foa et al., 2002) with total scores correlating with the Yale-
Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Goodman et al., 1989; r = .53), the Maudsley 
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977; r = .85) and the 
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National Institute of Mental Health Global Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Insel et al., 
1983; r = .66).    
2.2.5. Y-BOCS-SR. The Y-BOCS-SR (Baer, 1991) is a 68 item self-report 
questionnaire, adapted from the clinician-administered Y-BOCS (Goodman et al., 
1989). The Y-BOCS-SR consists of a 58 item symptom checklist of symptoms of 
OCD and measures the severity of these. 
The Y-BOCS-SR has good internal consistency (Steketee, Frost & Bogart, 
1996), test-retest reliability is excellent and correlations with the clinician rated 
version show good convergent validity (Steketee et al., 1996).  
 2.2.6. Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). The HADS (Zigmond 
& Snaith, 1983) is a 14 item self-report questionnaire that identifies anxiety disorders 
and depression through the use of two subscales, both of which are internally 
consistent. The items of the HADS were rated on a 4-point likert scale and totals from 
each subscale were calculated.  
 There is evidence to show that the HADS is a good measure to assess for the 
presence and severity of anxiety disorders and depression in both clinical and non-
clinical populations (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug & Neckelmann, 2002). It performs as well 
as other measures that assess for symptoms of depression and anxiety (Bjelland et al, 
2002).  
 2.2.7. Vignettes. Three vignettes were selected from those used in Greene et 
al. (2001; 2004), which have been widely validated within non-clinical samples and 
have been shown to be related to imagery (Amit & Greene, 2012), and three were 
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selected from Mancini and Gangemi (2015), which have been validated with OCD 
samples and used to find significant differences in the moral judgements of an OCD 
and comparison group (Mancini & Gangemi, 2015). All vignettes depicted moral 
dilemmas and detailed two potential courses of action: one involved action, killing 
fewer people but saving the lives of more (utilitarian); the other involved no action, 
but this resulted in more deaths (deontological).  
 Participants were asked to answer whether they should act according to the 
proposed utilitarian action or whether the participant considered it to be appropriate 
for them to do so. Participants were also asked whether this would be morally 
acceptable (yes/no), they were asked to rate the moral acceptability of the action and 
how vivid any imagery created was, on a scale of one to seven. Vignettes were all 
written from a utilitarian perspective; therefore, vignettes answered ‘No’ and rated as 
being morally unacceptable indicated a deontological moral judgement.  
2.3. Procedure 
Consenting participants completed the series of questionnaires and moral 
dilemmas. The instructions, questionnaires and vignettes were presented online, in the 
same order for each participant, using the research platform Qualtrics (Provo, 2016). 
Students received course credits for their participation. All other participants were 
given the opportunity to be entered into a prize draw.   
Correlations, t-tests, chi square and mediational analyses were used for the 
main analyses and effect sizes reported where appropriate. All analyses were two-
tailed.  
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3. Results 
When looking at the whole sample, results showed a negative correlation between 
OCI-R scores (M=20.85, S.D=14.73) and the moral acceptability of the proposed 
action in the vignettes, which was rated on a scale of one to seven (M=3.39, 
S.D=1.40), r(139)=-0.19,  p=0.02. That is, higher OCD symptomatology was 
associated with more deontological responses. Due to the association between 
depression and deontological moral judgements (Valdesolo & DeSteno 2006) further 
analyses were conducted, controlling for depression, as measured by the HADS 
(M=4.69, S.D=3.96),. This did not change the overall result (r(138)=-0.18, p=0.03). 
The effect size yielded (r=0.18) was small to moderate (Cohen, 1988). 
In order to explore any potential differences in the vignette types, they were 
also considered separately. When looking at Mancini and Gangemi’s vignettes 
(M=3.84, S.D=1.49) this result remained significant (r(142)=-0.22, p<0.01), even 
after controlling for depression (r(138)=-0.22, p<0.01; small to moderate effect size 
r=0.22).  However, when looking at Greene’s vignettes (M=2.97, S.D=1.59), the 
correlation was no longer significant (r(140)=-0.14, p=0.10; r(138)=-0.11, p=0.18 
when controlling for depression). This suggested OCD symptomatology to be 
associated with deontological judgements, only in certain types of scenarios.  
In considering whether participants who met criteria for the OCD group made 
more deontological moral judgements than those in the comparison group, data was 
analysed using chi-square and t-tests. Results showed participants who met criteria for 
the OCD group not to make significantly more deontological responses than the 
comparison group (59.22% and 53.70% deontological responses respectively; 
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χ2(1)=1.05, p=0.18); however, when participants were asked whether the utilitarian 
option was morally acceptable 61.02% of responses in the OCD group were ‘no’ 
compared to 41.98% in the comparison group. This difference was significant 
(χ2(1)=12.29, p<0.001) and equated to a small to medium effect size (=0.19).  
Whilst the OCD group had a lower mean moral acceptability score than the 
comparison group (M=3.43, S.D=1.37 and M=3.83, S.D=1.36 respectively), this 
difference was not significant (t(53)=1.10, p=0.28; F(1,52) = 0.12, p=0.73 when 
controlling for depression). Again, the vignette types were considered separately and 
results did not change (Greene’s vignettes: t(54)=0.50, p=0.62; F(1,53)=0.16, p=0.69 
after controlling for depression, Mancini and Gangemi’s vignettes: (t(54)=1.58, 
p=0.12; F(1,53)=1.21, p=0.28 after controlling for depression). This suggested that 
people with OCD did not make more deontological than utilitarian judgements, when 
compared to the comparison group, however they did feel the utilitarian option to be 
less morally acceptable.  
 To evaluate the potential mediational role of imagery in the relationship 
between OCD symptomatology and moral judgements, the PROCESS macro for 
SPSS (Hayes, 2012) was utilised. Imagery was measured using the VVQ Visual scale 
(a measure of visual/verbal cognitive style); M=12.83, S.D=1.93), SUIS (a measure of 
visual imagery; M=37.96, S.D=9.63) and vividness (M=4.56, S.D=1.61), in separate 
analyses. Moral judgement was measured using mean moral acceptability scores, both 
for the vignettes together as well as Greene’s and Mancini and Gangemi’s vignettes 
separately. As in previous analyses, depression was controlled for. 
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As Figure 1 illustrates, the relationship between OCD symptomatology and 
mean moral acceptability was not significantly mediated by imagery, as measured by 
the VVQ Visual scale. The significance of the indirect effect (standardised indirect 
effect = -0.02) was tested using bootstrapping procedures.  The bootstrapped 
unstandardised indirect effect was -0.02 and the 95% confidence interval ranged from 
-.08 to .003. 
 
 
 
 
*p<0.05 
Figure 1. Mediation model for OCD symptomatology on moral acceptability via 
imagery. 
Whilst there was a significant relationship between imagery and Greene’s mean moral 
acceptability, the relationship between OCD symptomatology and Greene’s moral 
acceptability was not significant and it was therefore not mediated by imagery (see 
Figure 2). The bootstrapped unstandardised indirect effect was -0.03 and the 95% 
confidence interval ranged from -.10 to .000. 
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*p<0.05 
Figure Two. Mediation model for OCD symptomatology on Greene’s moral 
acceptability via imagery 
Neither was the relationship between OCD symptomatology and Mancini and 
Gangemi’s moral acceptability significantly mediated by imagery (see Figure 3). The 
bootstrapped unstandardised indirect effect was -0.006 and the 95% confidence 
interval ranged from -.06 to .02. 
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*p<0.05 
Figure Three. Mediation model for OCD symptomatology on Mancini and Gangemi’s 
moral acceptability via imagery 
The hypothesis was also tested using the SUIS and vividness of imagery 
associated with the vignettes. In all of these cases, results of the mediation analyses 
were not significant (p>0.05 in all cases as all confidence intervals crossed 0). Neither 
trait nor state imagery mediated the relationship between OCD symptomatology and 
moral judgements.  
4. Discussion 
The findings of the study are consistent with the hypothesis that there are differences 
in the moral judgements made by individuals with and without OCD. Although no 
differences were found between groups in regard to the number of deontological 
moral judgements made, OCD symptomatology was significantly associated with 
more deontological moral judgements, particularly in certain situations. Further 
X  
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Imagery 
 
Y Moral 
Acceptability 
a=0.03 b=-0.19 
c’=-0.22* 
(c=-0.23*) 
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implicating the role of deontological principles in OCD, significantly more 
individuals with OCD felt that the utilitarian option was not morally acceptable.  
It is interesting to note that the groups did not differ on their judgements as to whether 
they felt they should choose to act according to the proposed utilitarian action, but did 
differ as to whether they thought the proposed action was morally acceptable. This 
highlights a potential difference between how people think they should behave and 
what is morally appropriate. Indeed, Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) asked about how 
likely individuals would be to act (‘commission’) or not act (‘omission’), whereas 
other research (eg. Amit & Greene, 2012) has asked about the moral acceptability of 
actions. It was assumed, in line with the theories of reasoned action (Ajzen & 
Fishbeun, 1980) and planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985), that people would act in a way 
that they intend and deem to be morally acceptable (Kant, 1959). However, there is 
evidence to suggest that this may not be the case and what individuals feel is more 
morally acceptable is not always aligned with the way in which they feel they should, 
and do act (Mitchell & Owens, 2004). In the current study, the analysis on the 
numbers of deontological/utilitarian decisions made was based on the question 
‘should you/is it appropriate for you to [utilitarian action]’ in a moral dilemma. The 
analysis on the moral acceptability of this action was based on the question ‘would 
this be morally acceptable’. Future research is needed in order to explore this 
potential difference further as it is possible that differences in questioning could 
account for the conflicting results.  
The possibility of imagery mediating the relationship between OCD and 
deontological moral judgements was not supported by the current study, suggesting 
the consideration of alternative explanations such as a heightened sense of personal 
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responsibility for one’s own actions (Franklin et al, 2009) and/or the unwanted 
deontological guilt of transgressing a moral norm (Mancini, 2008 cited in Gangemi & 
Mancini, 2011) in explaining the relationship between these areas. Nevertheless, the 
study did suggest imagery to have a role in deontological moral judgements made in 
certain situations, independently of OCD.  
The results showed symptoms of OCD to be associated with deontological 
moral judgements made by individuals, particularly in Mancini and Gangemi’s moral 
dilemmas. It is possible that the mechanisms around moral judgements in dilemmas 
depicting lower levels of agency and vividness and activating lower levels of 
emotion/empathy are somewhat different to those in moral dilemmas involving more 
agency and vividness and that the strength of this mechanism is affected by 
differences across vignettes. In addition, individuals with/without OCD may have 
differing sensitivities to the vividness of vignettes. This, as well as variation in the 
imagery’s vividness between vignettes, would need to be tested and validated as such 
in future studies.  
  A number of limitations of the current study could also be usefully 
addressed in future research. In regard to the vignettes, and in light of Wroe and 
Salkovskis’ (2000) work which showed decision-making in OCD to be different to 
that of non-clinical individuals only in situations that activated their idiosyncratic 
OCD concerns, the area could benefit from the development and validation of moral 
dilemmas that are specifically relevant to OCD. As Franklin et al. (2009) suggested 
the possibility of all individuals making the same judgements in life threatening 
dilemmas future studies could also employ the use of low-risk scenarios and real life 
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dilemmas in order to monitor any differences in the moral judgements of individuals 
with OCD in relation to these.  
As noted by Kahane and Shackel (2010), in both the current and previous studies, 
vignettes were written from a utilitarian perspective. In other words, the utilitarian 
judgements are those in which the person does not act, whereas the deontological 
judgements are those in which the person acts. This does not allow for control of 
omission bias which may influence decisions involving choice between action and 
inaction and perceived responsibility for potential harm (Wroe and Salkovskis, 2000). 
Omission bias is the judgement that action that results in harm (commission) is less 
acceptable than failing to act (omission) which results in the same harm. It may be 
that omission bias is playing a role in participants’ judgments of moral acceptability. 
In the development of this research, it seemed prudent to focus on just one potential 
process involved in moral judgements (that is, deontological vs. utilitarian 
judgements) and to use previously developed stimuli to add to the base of knowledge. 
However, as noted above, this may have created unavoidable confounds. In order to 
understand potential processes further, future research is necessary to assess decision 
making and moral judgements where options include deontological inactions and 
utilitarian actions.  
In further regard to the vignettes, the content of the images visualised by individuals 
(e.g. if the focus of an image was an individual being sacrificed to save a number of 
others or many being saved as a result of an individual being sacrificed) was not 
identified. It is possible that this content is related to their decision and would warrant 
further investigation in future research to improve the understanding of the processes 
underlying any effect. This would further determine whether the content of mental 
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imagery mediates a deontological/utilitarian response.   
It would also be of great interest to look further at the qualitative differences 
between Mancini and Gangemi’s and Greene’s vignettes, and their respective 
wordings, in order to establish any differences between them. Personal agency was 
not measured in the current study but may be a relevant factor in the moral 
judgements of individuals with OCD. A control group of individuals with anxiety 
disorders could also usefully be incorporated in future in order to determine any 
confounding effects of anxiety. 
This study nevertheless has implications for clinical work in the area, 
particularly for cognitive work. Tailored interventions, aimed at increasing 
psychological flexibility, could support individuals with OCD to have a greater 
understanding of the types of moral judgements they make and support their ability to 
consider both the overall picture as well as the factors closest to them. Interventions 
could also consider a focus on decision making in moral dilemmas, to elicit beliefs 
about responsibility and/or morality and incorporate work on the costs and benefits of 
transgressing morals. Aiming to support individuals to act, or not act, in ways that fit 
with their intentions could reduce psychological distress. Indeed, a greater 
understanding of the underlying fears of individuals of OCD has been shown to lead 
to improved outcomes (Huppert & Zlotnik, 2012) and this will also have important 
implications for service-wide outcomes.  
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